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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks could be deployed in hostile environments where eavesdropping
and node capture attacks are possible, inducing the need for cryptographic protection. In this
paper, we investigate the secure connectivity of wireless sensor networks utilizing the heteroge-
neous random key predistribution scheme, where each sensor node is classified as class-i with
probability µi for i = 1, . . . , r with µi > 0 and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Before deployment, a class-i
sensor is given Ki cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random from a key pool of size
P . After deployment, two sensor nodes can communicate securely over an available wireless
channel if they share at least one cryptographic key. In addition to the shared-key connectivity
of the network as governed by the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme, we con-
sider the wireless connectivity of the network using a heterogeneous on-off channel model, where
the channel between a class-i node and a class-j node is on (respectively, off) with probability
αij (respectively, 1 − αij) for i, j = 1, . . . , r inducing a channel probability matrix α = [αij ].
Collectively, two sensor nodes are adjacent if they i) share a cryptographic key and ii) have a
wireless channel in between that is on. We model the overall network using a composite random
graph obtained by the intersection of inhomogeneous random key graphs K(n;µ,K, P ) with
inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs G(n;µ,α). The former graph is naturally induced by the
heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme, while the latter is induced by the heteroge-
neous on-off channel model. More specifically, two nodes are adjacent in the composite graph
K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩ G(n;µ,α) if they are i) adjacent in K(n;µ,K, P ), i.e., share a cryptographic
key and ii) adjacent in G(n;µ,α), i.e., have an available wireless channel. Hence, edges in
K(n;µ,K, P )∩G(n;µ,α) represent pairs of sensors which share a key and also have an available
wireless channel in between. We investigate the connectivity of the composite random graph
K(n;µ,K, P )∩G(n;µ,α) and present conditions (in the form of zero-one laws) on how to scale
its parameters so that it i) has no secure node which is isolated and ii) is securely connected,
both with high probability when the number of nodes gets large. We also present numerical
results to support these zero-one laws in the finite-node regime.
A preliminary version of some of the material was presented at the 54th Annual Allerton Conference on Commu-
nications, Control and Computing in 2016 [1] and at the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory in
2017 [2]. This work has been supported in part by the National Science Foundation through grant CCF-1617934. R.
Eletreby was funded (in part) by the Dowd Fellowship from the College of Engineering at Carnegie Mellon University.
The authors would like to thank Philip and Marsha Dowd for their financial support and encouragement.
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1 Introduction
The proliferation of wireless sensor networks in multiple application domains, such as military ap-
plications, health care monitoring, among others, is attributed to their unique characteristics, such
as their versatility, small-size, low-cost, ease of use, and scalability [3–5]. These features, however,
give rise to unique security challenges that render wireless sensor networks vulnerable to a variety
of security threats such as node capture attacks, node replication attacks, and eavesdropping [6].
Indeed, power-hungry cryptosystems such as asymmetric cryptosystems (public-key) are infeasible
for securing large-scale wireless sensor networks that typically consist of battery-powered nodes
with simple computation and communication architectures [7–10]. Accordingly, symmetric cryp-
tosystems were shown to offer a faster and more energy-efficient alternative than their asymmetric
counterpart, and they are deemed as the most feasible choice for securing wireless sensor networks
[7, 8].
One key question associated with the use of symmetric cryptosystems is the design of key
distribution mechanisms that facilitate the establishment of a secure communication infrastructure
upon deploying the network and throughout its operation [8, 11]. These mechanisms shall i) be
fully distributed to avoid relying on any third party or a base station, ii) not assume any prior
knowledge of post-deployment configuration, and iii) obey the hardware limitations of wireless
sensor networks. Additionally, the resulting network shall be securely connected in a sense that
there exists a secure communication path (not necessarily single-hop) between any pair of sensor
nodes. The connectivity of the network is essential to its proper operation as it allows the exchange
of control and data messages between any pair of sensor nodes.
Random key predistribution schemes were proposed in the seminal work of Eschenauer and
Gligor [7] to provide a feasible solution for key distribution in large-scale wireless sensor networks
utilizing symmetric cryptosystems. In Eschenauer-Gligor scheme, each sensor node is assigned
(before deployment) K cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random from a large key pool of
size P . After deployment, two sensor nodes can communicate securely over an existing wireless
channel if they share at least one key. The scheme does not require any prior knowledge of post
deployment configuration and the communication infrastructure could be bootstrapped in a fully
distributed manner. The connectivity of wireless sensor networks secured by Eschenauer and Gligor
scheme was investigated in [12,13], where scaling conditions for K and P were given to ensure that
the resulting network is connected with high probability in the limit of large network size.
One inherent assumption with Eschenauer-Gligor scheme is that all sensor nodes are homo-
geneous, hence each node is given the same number K of cryptographic keys from the key pool.
However, emerging wireless sensor networks are essentially complex and heterogeneous with dif-
ferent nodes performing different roles or equipped with different hardware capabilities [14–17].
Hence, different nodes could be assigned different number of keys depending on their roles or de-
mands. For instance, a particular class of nodes may act as cluster heads which connect several
clusters of nodes together. These cluster heads need to communicate with a large number of nodes
in their vicinity and they are also expected to be more powerful than regular nodes. Thus, more
keys should be given to the cluster heads to ensure high levels of connectivity and security.
To accommodate the emerging heterogeneity of wireless sensor networks, Yag˘an proposed the
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heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme [18] as a generalization of Eschenauer-Gligor
scheme to account for the cases when the network comprises sensor nodes with varying level of
resources and connectivity requirements. The scheme is characterized by r different classes, where
each node is classified as class-i with probability µi with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1.
A class-i node is given Ki cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random (without replacement)
from a large key pool of size P . Without loss of generality, it is assumed that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr.
After deployment, two nodes can communicate securely over an existing channel if they share
at least one key. The heterogeneous scheme gives rise to a class of random graphs known as
inhomogeneous random key graphs K(n;µ,K,P ) [18], where each of the n vertices is classified as
class-i with probability µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r such that
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. A class-i vertex vx is given a
set Σx of Ki objects, selected uniformly at random (without replacement) from an object pool of
size P . Two vertices vx and vy are adjacent if they share at least one object, i.e., if Σx ∩ Σy 6= ∅.
In [18], Yag˘an derived scaling conditions for µ = {µ1, . . . , µr}, K , and P such that K(n;µ,K,P )
is connected with high probability in the limit of large network size. Essentially, the results given
in [18] provide guidelines on how to dimension the parameters of the heterogeneous random key
predistribution scheme, i.e., µ, K , and P , (with respect to the network size n) such that the
resulting network is securely connected.
Note that edges in K(n;µ,K,P ) represent pairs of sensors that share at least one cryptographic
key, hence the model only encodes shared-key connectivity. In other words, it is assumed that all
wireless channels are available and reliable, hence the only condition for two nodes to communicate
securely is to share a cryptographic key. In practice, the wireless channel is often unreliable and
sensor nodes typically have limited communication ranges, hence, two sensor nodes which share
a key may not eventually be adjacent due to the unavailability of their corresponding wireless
channel. Accordingly, the secure connectivity of the network would not only be governed by the
shared-key connectivity discussed above, but also by the wireless connectivity. As a result, the
scaling conditions given in [18] would be too optimistic for real-world deployments characterized
by unreliable wireless media.
In this paper, we investigate the connectivity of wireless sensor networks secured by the hetero-
geneous random key predistribution scheme under a heterogeneous on-off channel model. In this
channel model, the wireless channel between a class-i node and a class-j node is on with probability
αij and off with probability 1 − αij , independently. This gives rise to a r × r channel probability
matrix α where the element at the ith row and jth column is given by αij . The heterogeneous
on-off channel model accounts for the fact that different nodes could have different radio capabili-
ties, or could be deployed in locations with different channel characteristics. In addition, it offers
the flexibility of modeling several interesting scenarios, such as when nodes of the same type are
more (or less) likely to be adjacent with one another than with nodes belonging to other classes.
The heterogeneous on-off channel model gives rise to inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [19, 20],
denoted hereafter by G(n,µ,α). In these graphs, each of the n vertices is classified as class-i with
probability µi > 0 such that
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Two vertices vx and vy, which belong to class-i and
class-j, respectively, are adjacent if B(αij) = 1, where B(αij) denotes a Bernoulli random variable
with success probability αij.
Edges in inhomogeneous random keys graphs encode shared-key relationships, while edges in
inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs encode the availability of wireless channels. Hence, the overall
network can be modeled by a composite random graph model formed by the intersection of an
inhomogeneous random key graph with an inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph. We denote the
3
intersection graph K(n;µ,K,P )∩G(n;µ,α) by H(n;µ,K,P,α). An edge exists in H(n;µ,K,P,α)
only if it exists in K(n;µ,K,P ), i.e., both nodes share a key, and G(n;µ,α), i.e., both nodes share
a wireless channel. Hence, edges in H(n;µ,K,P,α) represent pairs of sensors that both i) share a
key and ii) have a wireless channel in between that is on.
We investigate the connectivity of the composite random graph H(n;µ,K,P,α) and present
conditions (in the form of zero-one laws) on how to scale its parameters, i.e., µ, K , P , and α,
so that it i) has no secure node which is isolated and ii) is securely connected, both with high
probability when the number of nodes gets large. Essentially, our results provide design guidelines
on how to choose the parameters of the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme such that
the resulting wireless sensor network is securely connected under a heterogeneous on-off channel
model. Our results are supported by a simulation study demonstrating that despite their asymptotic
nature, our results can in fact be useful in designing finite-node wireless sensor network so that
they achieve secure connectivity with high probability.
We close with a word on notation and conventions in use. All limiting statements, including
asymptotic equivalence are considered with the number of sensor nodes n going to infinity. The
random variables (rvs) under consideration are all defined on the same probability triple (Ω,F ,P).
Probabilistic statements are made with respect to this probability measure P, and we denote the
corresponding expectation by E. The indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1[E]. We
say that an event holds with high probability (whp) if it holds with probability 1 as n → ∞. For
any discrete set S, we write |S| for its cardinality. In comparing the asymptotic behaviors of the
sequences {an}, {bn}, we use an = o(bn), an = ω(bn), an = O(bn), an = Ω(bn), and an = Θ(bn),
with their meaning in the standard Landau notation. We also use an ∼ bn to denote the asymptotic
equivalence limn→∞ an/bn = 1.
2 The Model
2.1 Shared-key connectivity: Inhomogeneous random key graphs K(n;µ,K, P )
Consider n sensor nodes labeled as v1, v2, . . . , vn, where each node is classified into one of r classes
with a probability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. A
class-i node is assigned Ki cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random (without replacement)
from a key pool of size P . It follows that the key ring Σx of node x is a PKtx -valued random variable
(rv) where PKtx denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , P} with exactly Ktx elements and
tx denotes the class of node vx. The rvs Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σn are then i.i.d. with
P[Σx = S | tx = i] =
(
P
Ki
)−1
, S ∈ PKi .
Let K = {K1,K2, . . . ,Kr} and assume without loss of generality that K1 ≤ K2 ≤ . . . ≤ Kr.
Consider a random graph K induced on the vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that a pair of distinct
nodes vx and vy are adjacent in K, denoted by vx ∼K vy, if they have at least one key in common,
i.e.,
vx ∼K vy if Σx ∩ Σy 6= ∅. (1)
The adjacency condition (1) defines inhomogeneous random key graphs denoted byK(n;µ,K,P )
[18]. This model is also known in the literature as the general random intersection graph; e.g., see
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[21–23]. The probability pij that a class-i node and a class-j node are adjacent is given by
pij = 1−
(P−Ki
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) (2)
as long as Ki + Kj ≤ P ; otherwise if Ki + Kj > P , we have pij = 1. Let λi denote the mean
probability that a class-i node is connected to another node in K(n;µ,K,P ). We have
λi =
r∑
j=1
µjpij . (3)
2.2 Wireless connectivity: Inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs G(n;µ,α)
In practical deployments of wireless sensor networks, nodes typically have limited communication
ranges and the channel between two nodes may not be available, e.g., due to excessive interference.
In other words, two sensor nodes which share a key may not eventually be adjacent due to the
unavailability of their corresponding wireless channel. Hence, the secure connectivity of the network
would not only be governed by the shared-key connectivity discussed above, but also by the wireless
connectivity.
In modeling the wireless connectivity of the network, we utilize a heterogeneous on-off channel
model, where the wireless channel between a class-i node and a class-j node is on (respectively, off)
with probability αij (respectively, 1 − αij) for i, j = 1, . . . , r. Note that the heterogeneous on-off
channel model accounts for the fact that different nodes could have different radio capabilities, or
could be deployed in locations with different channel characteristics. This is indeed a generalization
of the uniform on-off channel model, where the channel between any two nodes is on (respectively,
off) with probability α (respectively, 1 − α) regardless of the corresponding classes. Hence, the
heterogeneous on-off channel model offers the flexibility of modeling several interesting scenarios,
such as when nodes of the same type are more (or less) likely to be adjacent with one another than
with nodes belonging to other classes.
Consider a random graph G induced on the vertex set V = {v1, . . . , vn} such that each node is
classified into one of the r classes with a probability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0
for i = 1, . . . , r and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Then, a distinct class-i node vx and a distinct class-j node
vy are adjacent in G, denoted by vx ∼G vy, if Bxy(αij) = 1 where Bxy(αij) denotes a Bernoulli
rv with success probability αij . This gives rise to an r × r edge probability matrix α where αij
denotes the element of row i and column j of α. The aforementioned adjacency conditions induces
the inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph G(n;µ,α) on the vertex set V, which has received interest
recently [19,20].
Although the on-off channel model may be considered too simple, it allows a comprehensive
analysis of the properties of interest and is often a good approximation of more realistic chan-
nel models, e.g., the disk model [24]. In fact, the simulations results in [25] suggest that the
k-connectivity behavior of wireless sensor networks secured by the heterogeneous random key pre-
distribution scheme under the uniform on-off channel model (where αij = α for i, j = 1, . . . , r) is
asymptotically equivalent to that under the more-realistic disk model.
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2.3 The composite random graph H (n;µ,K, P,α) := K(n;µ,K, P ) ∩G(n;µ,α)
Each of the above two random graph models captures a particular notion of connectivity, namely
shared-key connectivity and wireless connectivity, respectively. In what follows, we construct a
random graph model that jointly considers both notions, hence, it accurately describes practical
deployments of wireless sensor networks, where two nodes are adjacent if they both share a key
and have an available wireless channel in between.
We consider a composite random graph obtained by the intersection of inhomogeneous random
key graphs K(n;µ,K,P ) with inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs G(n;µ,α). We denote the inter-
section graph by H(n;µ,K,P,α), i.e., H(n;µ,K,P,α) := K(n;µ,K,P ) ∩G(n;µ,α). Hence, edges
in the intersection graph H(n;µ,K,P,α) represent pairs of sensor which i) share a key and ii) have
a wireless channel in between that is on. In particular, a distinct class-i node vx is adjacent to a
distinct class-j node vy in H if and only if they are adjacent in both K and G.
To simplify the notation, we let θ = (K,P ), and Θ = (θ,α). By independence, we see that
the probability of edge assignment between a class-i node vx and a class-j node vy in H(n;µ,Θ) is
given by
P[vx ∼ vy | tx = i, ty = j] = αijpij
Similar to (3), we denote the mean edge probability for a class-i node in H(n;µ,Θ) as Λi. It is
clear that
Λi =
r∑
j=1
µjαijpij, i = 1, . . . , r. (4)
We write Λm to denote the minimum mean edge probability in H(n;µ,Θ), i.e.,
m := argmin
i
Λi. (5)
We further let αmin := mini,j{αij} and αmax := maxi,j{αij}. Finally, we define d and s as follows
d := argmax
j
{αmj}, (6)
s := argmax
j
{αmjpmj}. (7)
Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is fixed and does not scale with n, and so
are the probabilities µ1, . . . , µr. All of the remaining parameters are assumed to be scaled with n.
3 Main Results and Discussion
We refer to a mapping K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 as a scaling (for inhomogeneous random key
graphs) if
1 ≤ K1,n ≤ K2,n ≤ . . . ≤ Kr,n ≤ Pn/2 (8)
hold for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Similarly any mapping α = {αij} : N0 → (0, 1)r×r defines a scaling for
inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs. A mapping Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1)r×r defines a scaling for the
intersection graph H(n;µ,Θ) given that condition (8) holds. We remark that under (8), the edge
probabilities pij will be given by (2).
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3.1 Results
We first present a zero-one law for the absence of isolated nodes in H(n;µ,Θn).
Theorem 3.1. Consider a probability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r,
a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , and a scaling α = {αij} : N0 → (0, 1)r×r such that
Λm(n) ∼ c log n
n
(9)
holds for some c > 0.
i) If
lim
n→∞
αmd(n) log n = 0 or lim
n→∞
αmm(n) log n = α
∗ ∈ (0,∞]
holds, then we have
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;µ,Θn) has no isolated nodes] = 0 if c < 1
ii) We have
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;µ,Θn) has no isolated nodes] = 1 if c > 1
Next, we present an analogous result for connectivity.
Theorem 3.2. Consider a probability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µr} with µi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r,
a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , and a scaling α = {αij} : N0 → (0, 1)r×r such that (9) holds
for some c > 0.
i) If
lim
n→∞
αmd(n) log n = 0 or lim
n→∞
αmm(n) log n = α
∗ ∈ (0,∞]
holds, then we have
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 0 if c < 1
ii) If
Pn ≥ σn, n = 1, 2, . . . (10)
for some σ > 0, and
αmin(n)p1r(n) = Ω
(
log n
n
)
(11)
Kr,n
K1,n
= o (log n) (12)
αmax(n)
αmin(n)
= O ((log n)τ ) (13)
for any finite τ > 0. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
P [H(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 1 if c > 1
The scaling condition (9) will often be used in the form
Λm(n) = cn
log n
n
, n = 2, 3, . . . (14)
with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Also, condition (11) will often be used in the form
αmin(n)p1r(n) ≥ ρ log n
n
, for ρ > 0 and n = 2, 3, . . . (15)
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3.2 Discussion
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 state that H(n;µ,Θn) has no isolated node (and is connected) with high
probability if the minimum mean degree, i.e., nΛm, is scaled as (1 + ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0. On
the other hand, if this minimum mean degree scales as (1− ǫ) log n for some ǫ > 0, then with high
probability H(n;µ,Θn) has an isolated node, and hence is not connected. The resemblance of the
results presented in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 indicates that absence of isolated nodes and
connectivity are asymptotically equivalent properties for H(n;µ,Θn). Similar observations were
made for other well-known random graph models as well; e.g., inhomogeneous random key graphs
[18], Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [26], and (homogeneous) random key graphs [12].
Note that if the matrix α is designed in such a way that αii = maxj{αij}, i.e., two nodes of
the same type are more likely to be adjacent in G(n;µ,α), then we have αmd = αmm and the
condition of the zero-law of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 would collapse to i) limn→∞ αmm(n) log n = 0
or ii) limn→∞ αmm(n) log n ∈ (0,∞]. At this point, the zero-law follows even when the sequence
αmm log n does not have a limit by virtue of the subsubsequence principle [27, p. 12] (see also
[25, Section 7.3]). In other words, if αmd = αmm, then the zero-law of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 follows
without any conditions on the sequence αmm(n) log n.
We now comment on the additional technical conditions needed for the one-law of Theorem 3.2.
Condition (10) is likely to be needed in practical deployments of wireless sensor networks in order
to ensure the resilience of the network against node capture attacks; e.g., see [7, 13]. To see this,
assume that an adversary captures a number of sensors, compromising all the keys that belong to
the captured nodes. If Pn = o(n), contrary to (10), then it would be possible for the adversary
to compromise Ω(Pn) keys by capturing only o(n) sensors (whose type does not matter). In this
case, the wireless sensor network would fail to exhibit the unassailability property [28, 29] and
would be deemed as vulnerable against adversarial attacks. We remark that (10) was required in
[18,25,30,31] in similar settings to ours.
Condition (11) provides a non-trivial lower bound on the edge probability αmin(n)p1r(n) and is
enforced mainly for technical reasons for the proof of the one-law of Theorem 3.2 to work. Note
that it is easy to show that αmin(n)p1r(n) = O (log n/n) from (14) (see Lemma 5.3 for a proof),
however, the scaling condition given by (14) does not provide any non-trivial lower-bound on the
product αmin(n)p1r(n). Observe that, even with condition (11), our results do not require each
edge probability to scale as log n/n, in contrast to the results given in [19] on the connectivity of
inhomogeneous Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs. In particular, the probability of an edge between a class-i node
and a class-j node was set to κ (i, j) log n/n in [19], where κ (i, j) returns a positive real number
for each pair (i, j); i.e., each individual edge was scaled as Θ(log n/n).
Condition (12) is also enforced mainly for technical reasons and it takes away from the flexibility
of assigning very small key key rings to a certain fraction of sensors when connectivity is considered.
An equivalent condition was also needed in [18] for establishing the one-law for connectivity in inho-
mogeneous random key graphs. We refer the reader to [18, Section 3.2] for an extended discussion
on the feasibility of (12) for real-world implementations of wireless sensor networks. Condition
(13) also limits the flexibility of assigning very small values for αmin, but it is much milder than
condition (12) in a sense that it requires αmax(n)/αmin(n) to be O ((log n)
τ ) for some finite τ > 0,
i.e., one can still afford to have a large deviation between αmin(n) and αmax(n) as compared to the
case if αmax(n)/αmin(n) had to be scaled as o(log n), similar to the case in (12).
We close by providing a concrete example that demonstrates how all the conditions required by
Theorem 3.2 can be met in a real-world implementation. Consider a sensor network consisting of
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two classes, i.e., r = 2. Pick any probability distribution µ = {µ1, µ2} with µi > 0 for all i = 1, 2.
Set Pn = ⌈n log n⌉ as well as
K1,n =
⌈
(log n)1/2+ε√
αmin(n)
⌉
and K2,n =
⌈
(1 + ε)(log n)3/2−ε
µ2
√
αmin(n)
⌉
with any 0 < ε < 0.5. Observe that the above selection satisfies (10) as well as (12). Next, set
α = αmin(n)
[
1+ǫ
µ1
(log n)1−2ǫ 1
1 µ21+ǫ (log n)
1+2ǫ
]
Note that the above selection satisfies (13) with τ = 1+2ǫ. For simplicity, assume that λ1(n) = o(1)
which implies that p1j(n) = o(1) for j = 1, 2. In this case, we have p1j(n) ∼ K1,nKj,nPn for j = 1, 2
(see [18, Lemma 4.2]). With this parameter selection, we have
αmin(n)p12(n) ∼ αmin(n)K1,nK2,n
Pn
=
1 + ǫ
µ2
log n
n
which satisfies (11).
Finally, observe that with the above parameter selection, both Λ1(n) and Λ2(n) are strictly
larger than log n/n. Hence, in view of Theorem 3.2, the resulting network will be connected with
high probability. Of course, there are many other parameter scalings that one can choose.
3.3 Comparison with related work
The connectivity (respectively, k-connectivity) of wireless sensor networks secured by the classical
Eschenauer-Gligor scheme under a uniform on/off channel model was investigated in [32] (respec-
tively, [31]). The network was modeled by a composite random graph formed by the intersection
of random key graphs K(n;K,P ) (induced by Eschenauer-Gligor scheme) with Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs
G(n;α) (induced by the uniform on-off channel model). Our paper generalizes this model to het-
erogeneous setting where different nodes could be given different number of keys depending on their
respective classes and the availability of a wireless channel between two nodes depends on their
respective classes. Hence, our model highly resembles emerging wireless sensor networks which are
essentially complex and heterogeneous.
In [18], Yag˘an considered the connectivity of wireless sensor networks secured by the hetero-
geneous random key predistribution scheme under the full visibility assumption, i.e., all wireless
channels are available and reliable, hence the only condition for two nodes to be adjacent is to
share a key. It is clear that the full visibility assumption is not likely to hold in most practical
deployments of wireless sensor networks as the wireless medium is typically unreliable. Our paper
extends the results given in [18] to more practical scenarios where the wireless connectivity is taken
into account through the heterogeneous on-off channel model. In fact, by setting αij(n) = 1 for
i, j = 1, . . . , r and each n = 1, 2, . . . (i.e., by assuming that all wireless channels are on), our results
reduce to those given in [18].
In comparison with the existing literature on similar models, our result can be seen to extend
the work by Eletreby and Yag˘an in [30] (respectively, [25]). Therein, the authors established a
zero-one law for the 1-connectivity (respectively, k-connectivity) of K(n;µ,K,P )∩G(n;α), i.e., for
a wireless sensor network under the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme and a uniform on-off
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channel model. Although these results form a crucial starting point towards the analysis of the
heterogeneous key predistribution scheme under a wireless connectivity model, they are limited to
uniform on-off channel model where all channels are on (respectively, off) with the same probability
α (respectively, 1−α). The heterogeneous on-off channel model accounts for the fact that different
nodes could have different radio capabilities, or could be deployed in locations with different channel
characteristics. In addition, it offers the flexibility of modeling several interesting scenarios, such
as when nodes of the same type are more (or less) likely to be adjacent with one another than
with nodes belonging to other classes. Indeed, by setting αij(n) = α for i, j = 1, . . . , r and each
n = 1, 2, . . ., our results reduce to those given in [30].
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we present a simulation study to validate our results in the finite-node regime. In
all experiments, we fix the number of nodes at n = 500, the size of the key pool at P = 104, and
the number of experiments to 400.
In Figure 1, we set the channel matrix to
α =
[
0.3 α12
α12 0.3
]
and consider three different values for the parameter α12, namely, α12 = 0.2, α12 = 0.4, and
α12 = 0.6. We also vary K1 (i.e., the smallest key ring size) from 5 to 25. The number of classes is
fixed to 2, with µ = {0.5, 0.5}. For each value of K1, we set K2 = K1+5. For each parameter pair
(K,α), we generate 400 independent samples of the graph H(n;µ,Θ) and count the number of times
(out of a possible 400) that the obtained graphs i) have no isolated nodes and ii) are connected.
Dividing the counts by 400, we obtain the (empirical) probabilities for the events of interest. In all
cases considered here, we observe that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected whenever it has no isolated nodes
yielding the same empirical probability for both events. This confirms the asymptotic equivalence
of the connectivity and absence of isolated nodes properties in H(n;µ,Θn) as is illustrated in
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
For each value of α12, we show the critical threshold of connectivity given by Theorem 3.2 in
the form of highlighted symbols. More specifically, highlighted symbols stand for the minimum
integer value of K1 that satisfies
Λm(n) =
2∑
j=1
µjαmj
(
1−
(P−Kj
Km
)
( P
Km
)
)
>
log n
n
. (16)
upon noting that K2 = K1+5. We see from Figure 1 that the probability of connectivity transitions
from zero to one within relatively small variations of K1. Moreover, the critical values of K1
obtained by (16) lie within this transition interval and correspond to high probability of connectivity.
Note that for each parameter pair (K,α) in Figure 1, we have Λm = Λ1 by construction.
Next, we set the channel matrix to
α =
[
α11 0.2
0.2 0.2
]
in Figure 2, and consider three different values for the parameter α11, namely, α11 = 0.2, α11 = 0.4,
and α11 = 0.6. We also vary K1 from 10 to 25. The number of classes is fixed to 2, with
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Figure 1: Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function of K for α12 = 0.2,
α12 = 0.4, and α12 = 0.6. We set α11 = α22 = 0.3. Highlighted symbols stand for the critical
threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2.
µ = {0.5, 0.5}. For each value of K1, we set K2 = K1 + 5. Similar to Figure 1, we obtain the
empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected versus K1. As before, the critical threshold of
connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2 is shown by highlighted symbols in each curve.
Note that for α11 ≥ 0.4, fixed α12, and fixed α22, the probability of connectivity (along with
the critical value of K1) behave in a similar fashion regardless of the particular value of α11. The
reason behind this is intuitive. When α11 = 0.2, we have Λm = Λ1, while for α11 ≥ 0.4, we have
Λm = Λ2. Consequently, the value of α11 (which only appears in Λ1) becomes irrelevant to the
scaling condition given by (16).
Finally, we set the channel matrix to
α =
[
α 0.2
0.2 α
]
and consider four different values for the parameter K1, namely, K1 = 20, K1 = 25, K1 = 30,
and K1 = 35 while varying the parameter α from 0 to 1. The number of classes is fixed to 2 with
µ = {0.5, 0.5} and we set K2 = K1 + 5 for each value of K1. We plot the empirical probability
that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected versus α and highlight the critical threshold of connectivity asserted
by Theorem 3.2. Note that H(n;µ,Θ) has a positive probability to be connected with α12 > 0
even when α = 0. In this case, the connected instances of H(n;µ,Θ) represent connected bipartite
graphs, where one set of the bipartite graph represents class-1 nodes and the other represents
class-2 nodes. The results given by Figure 3 reveal the importance of cross-type edge probability
in establishing a connected graph. In particular, when α11 = α22 = 0, the graph could still be
connected owing to cross-type edges. Indeed, the graph cannot be connected when cross-type edges
have zero probability, even when same-type edges have positive probability since the graph would
consist of at least two isolated components, as captured by Figure 4.
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Figure 2: Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function of K for α11 = 0.2,
α11 = 0.4, and α11 = 0.6. We set α12 = α22 = 0.2. Highlighted symbols stand for the critical
threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2.
5 Preliminaries
Several technical results are collected here for convenience. The first result follows easily from the
scaling condition (8).
Proposition 5.1 ([18, Proposition 4.1]). For any scaling K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 , we have
λ1(n) ≤ λ2(n) ≤ . . . ≤ λr(n) (17)
for each n = 2, 3, . . ..
Proposition 5.2 ([18, Proposition 4.4]). For any set of positive integers K1, . . . ,Kr, P and any
scalar a ≥ 1, we have (P−⌈aKi⌉
Kj
)
( P
Kj
) ≤
((P−Ki
Kj
)
( P
Kj
)
)a
, i, j = 1, . . . , r (18)
Lemma 5.3. Consider a scaling K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 and a scaling α = {αij} : N0 →
(0, 1)r×r such that (11) and (14) hold. We have
αmin(n)p1r(n) = Θ
(
log n
n
)
(19)
Proof. We note from (14) that
αmr(n)pmr(n) ≤ Λm(n)
µr
=
cn
µr
log n
n
,
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Figure 3: Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function of α for K1 = 20,
K1 = 25, K1 = 30, and K1 = 35. We set α12 = 0.2. Highlighted symbols stand for the critical
threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2.
Next, we show that under (8), the quantity pij(n) is increasing in both i and j. Fix n = 2, 3, . . .
and recall that under (8), Ki increases as i increases. For any i, j such that Ki + Kj > P , we
see from (2) that pij(n) = 1; otherwise if Ki +Kj ≤ P , we have pij(n) < 1. Given that Ki +Kj
increases with both i and j, it will be sufficient to show that pij(n) increases with both i and j on
the range where Ki +Kj < P . On that range, we have(P−Ki
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
) = Ki−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− Kj
P − ℓ
)
Hence,
(P−Ki
Kj
)
/
( P
Kj
)
decreases with both Ki and Kj, hence with i and j. From (2), it follows that
pij(n) increases with i and j. As a consequence, we have p1r ≤ pmr and it follows that
αmin(n)p1r(n) ≤ αmr(n)pmr(n) ≤ cn
µr
log n
n
. (20)
Combining (11) and (20) we readily obtain (19).
Lemma 5.4. Consider a scaling K1,K2, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 and a scaling α = {αij} : N0 →
(0, 1)r×r such that (9) holds. From (11), (12), (13), and (20), we have
αmax(n)prr(n) = o
(
(log n)τ+2
n
)
(21)
and
αminp11(n) = ω
(
1
n
)
, (22)
13
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
α12 = α21
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
v
it
y
α11 = α22 = 0.1
K1 = 20
K1 = 25
K1 = 30
K1 = 35
Figure 4: Empirical probability that H(n;µ,Θ) is connected as a function of α12 for K1 = 20,
K1 = 25, K1 = 30, and K1 = 35. We set α11 = α22 = 0.2. Highlighted symbols stand for the
critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2.
Proof. From (13) and (20), we have
αmax(n)p1r(n) =
(
αmax(n)
αmin(n)
)
αmin(n)p1r(n) = O
(
(log n)τ+1
n
)
(23)
It is now immediate that Lemma 5.4 is established once we show that
prr(n)
p1r(n)
= o (log n) , (24)
leading to
αmax(n)prr(n) =
(
prr(n)
p1r(n)
)
αmax(n)p1r(n) = o
(
(log n)τ+2
n
)
We proceed by establishing (24). The proof is similar with [30, Lemma 5.4], but we give it below
for completeness.
In particular, we will show that
prr(n) ≤ max
(
2,
log n
wn
)
p1r(n), n = 2, 3, . . . (25)
for some sequence wn such that limn→∞wn = ∞. Fix n = 2, 3, . . . . We have either p1r(n) > 12 , or
p1r(n) ≤ 12 . In the former case, it automatically holds that
prr(n) ≤ 2p1r(n) (26)
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by virtue of the fact that prr(n) ≤ 1.
Assume now that p1r(n) ≤ 12 . We know from [12, Lemmas 7.1-7.2] that
1− e−
Kj,nKr,n
Pn ≤ pjr(n) ≤ Kj,nKr,n
Pn −Kj,n , j = 1, . . . , r (27)
and it follows that
K1,nKr,n
Pn
≤ log
(
1
1− p1r(n)
)
≤ log 2 < 1. (28)
Using the fact that 1− e−x ≥ x2 with x in (0, 1), we then get
p1r(n) ≥ K1,nKr,n
2Pn
. (29)
In addition, using the upper bound in (27) with j = r gives
prr(n) ≤
K2r,n
Pn −Kr,n ≤ 2
K2r,n
Pn
as we invoke (8). Combining the last two bounds we obtain
prr(n)
p1r(n)
≤ 4Kr,n
K1,n
= 4
log n
wn
(30)
by virtue of (12) for some sequence wn satisfying limn→∞wn = ∞. Combining (26) and (30), we
readily obtain (25). This establishes (21).
Next, Combining (11), and the fact that p1r(n)/p11(n) = o(log n) (see (25)), we get
αmin(n)p11(n) =
(
p11(n)
p1r(n)
)
αmin(n)p1r(n) = ω
(
1
n
)
which readily establishes (22).
Lemma 5.5. Under (22), we have
K21,n
Pn
= ω
(
1
nαmin
)
, (31)
and
K1,n = ω(1). (32)
Proof. It is a simple matter to check that p11(n) ≤ K
2
1,n
Pn−K1,n
; see [12, Proposition 7.1-7.2] for a
proof. In view of (8) this gives p11(n) ≤ 2K
2
1,n
Pn
. Thus, we have
K21,n
Pn
= Ω(p11(n)) = ω
(
1
nαmin
)
.
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From (10), (31), and αmin ≤ 1, we readily obtain (32).
Other useful bound that will be used throughout is
(1± x) ≤ e±x, x ∈ (0, 1) (33)(
n
ℓ
)
≤
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
, ℓ = 1, . . . , n, n = 1, 2, . . . (34)
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
≤ 2n (35)
Finally, we find it useful to write
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x), x ∈ (0, 1) (36)
where Ψ(x) =
∫ x
0
t
1−t dt. From L’Hoˆpital’s Rule, we have
lim
x→0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
−x− log(1− x)
x2
=
1
2
. (37)
6 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on the method of first and second moments applied to the num-
ber of isolated nodes in H(n;µ,Θn). Let In(µ,Θn) denote the total number of isolated nodes in
H(n;µ,Θn), namely,
In(µ,Θn) =
n∑
ℓ=1
1[vℓ is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn)] (38)
The method of first moment [27, Eqn. (3.1), p. 54] gives
1− E[In(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[In(µ,Θn) = 0]
6.1 Establishing the one-law
It is clear that in order to establish the one-law, namely that limn→∞ P [In(µ,Θn) = 0] = 1, we
need to show that
lim
n→∞
E[In(µ,Θn)] = 0.
Recalling (38), we have
E [In(µ,Θn)] = n
r∑
i=1
µiP [v1 is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn) | t1 = i] (39)
= n
r∑
i=1
µiP
[∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | t1 = i]
= n
r∑
i=1
µi (P [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i])n−1 (40)
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where (39) follows by the exchangeability of the indicator functions appearing at (38) and (40)
follows by the conditional independence of the rvs {vj ≁ v1}nj=1 given t1. By conditioning on the
class of v2, we find
P[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i] =
r∑
j=1
µjP[v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = i, t2 = j] =
r∑
j=1
µj(1− αpij) = 1− Λi(n). (41)
Using (41) in (40), and recalling (5), (33) we obtain
E[In(µ,Θn)] = n
r∑
i=1
µi (1− Λi(n))n−1
≤ n (1− Λm(n))n−1
= n
(
1− cn log n
n
)n−1
≤ elogn(1−cn n−1n )
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, we immediately get
lim
n→∞
E[In(µ,Θn)] = 0.
since limn→∞(1− cn n−1n ) = 1− c < 0 under the enforced assumptions (with c > 1) and the one-law
is established.
6.2 Establishing the zero-law
Our approach in establishing the zero-law relies on the method of second moment applied to a
variable that counts the number of nodes that are class-m and isolated. Clearly if we can show that
whp there exists at least one class-m node that is isolated under the enforced assumptions (with
c < 1) then the zero-law would immediately follow.
Let Yn(µ,Θn) denote the number of nodes that are class-m and isolated in H(n;µ,Θn), and let
xn,i(µ,Θn) = 1[ti = m ∩ vi is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn)],
then we have Yn(µ,Θn) =
∑n
i=1 xn,i(µ,Θn). By applying the method of second moments [27,
Remark 3.1, p. 54] on Yn(µ,Θn), we get
P[Yn(µ,Θn) = 0] ≤ 1− (E[Yn(µ,Θn)])
2
E[Yn(µ,Θn)2]
(42)
where
E[Yn(µ,Θn)] = nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] (43)
and
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2] =nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] + n(n− 1)E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)] (44)
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by exchangeability and the binary nature of the rvs {xn,i(µ,Θn)}ni=1. Using (43) and (44), we get
E[Yn(µ,Θn)
2]
(E[Yn(µ,Θn)])
2 =
1
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)]
+
n− 1
n
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
(E[xn,1(µ,Θn)])
2
In order to establish the zero-law, we need to show that
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞,
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E[xn,1(µ,Θn)xn,2(µ,Θn)]
(E[xn,1(µ,Θn)])
2
)
≤ 1. (45)
Proposition 6.1. Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 and a scaling α = {αij} := N0 →
(0, 1)r×r such that (9) holds with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞, if c < 1
Proof. We have
nE [xn,1(µ,Θn)] = nE [1[t1 = m ∩ v1 is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn)]]
= nµmP [v1 is isolated in H(n;µ,Θn) | t1 = m]
= nµmP
[∩nj=2[vj ≁ v1] | t1 = m]
= nµmP [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = m]n−1
= nµm

 r∑
j=1
µjP [v2 ≁ v1 | t1 = 1, t2 = j]


n−1
= nµm

 r∑
j=1
µj(1− αmjpmj)


n−1
(46)
= nµm (1− Λm(n))n−1 = µmeβn (47)
where
βn = log n+ (n− 1) log(1− Λm(n)).
Recalling (36), we get
βn = log n− (n− 1) (Λm(n) + Ψ(Λm(n)))
= log n− (n− 1)
(
cn
log n
n
+Ψ
(
cn
log n
n
))
= log n
(
1− cnn− 1
n
)
− (n− 1)
(
cn
log n
n
)2 Ψ(cn lognn )(
cn
logn
n
)2 (48)
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Recalling (37), we have
lim
n→∞
Ψ
(
cn
logn
n
)
(
cn
logn
n
)2 = 12 (49)
since cn
logn
n = o(1). Thus, βn = log n
(
1− cn n−1n
) − o(1). Using (47), (48), (49), and letting n go
to infinity, we get
lim
n→∞
nE[xn,1(µ,Θn)] =∞
whenever limn→∞ cn = c < 1. 
Proposition 6.2. Consider a scaling K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 and a scaling α = {αij} := N0 →
(0, 1)r×r such that (9) holds with limn→∞ cn = c > 0. Then, we have (45) if c < 1.
Proof. Consider fixed Θ.
E [xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)] = E [1[v1 is isolated , v2 is isolated ∩ t1 = m, t2 = m]]
= µ2mE
[
1[v1 is isolated , v2 is isolated]
∣∣∣ t1 = m, t2 = m]
= µ2mE
[
1[v1 ≁ v2]
n∏
k=3
1[vk ≁ v1, vk ≁ v2]
∣∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = m
]
Now we condition on Σ1 and Σ2 and note that i) Σ1 and Σ2 determine t1 and t2; and ii) the events
[v1 ≁ v2], {[vk ≁ v1 ∩ vk ≁ v2]}nk=3 are mutually independent given Σ1 and Σ2. Thus, we have
E [xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)] = µ
2
mE
[
P
[
v1 ≁ v2
∣∣∣ Σ1,Σ2]× n∏
k=3
P
[
vk ≁ v1 ∩ vk ≁ v2
∣∣∣ Σ1,Σ2]
∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = m
]
(50)
Define the {0, 1}-valued rv u(θ) by
u(θ) := 1[Σ1 ∩Σ2 6= ∅]. (51)
Next, with ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, define νℓ,j(α) by
νℓ,j(α) := {i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ : Bij(α) = 1} (52)
for each j = ℓ+1, . . . , n. Namely, νℓ,j(α) is the set of nodes in {1, . . . , ℓ} that are adjacent to node
j in G(n;µ,α). With these definitions in mind, (50) gives
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)] = µ
2
mE

(1− αmm)u(θ)
n∏
k=3
(
P −
∣∣∣∪i∈ν2,k(α)Σi∣∣∣
|Σk|
)
(
P
|Σk|
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
t1 = t2 = m


Conditioned on u(θ) = 0 and v1, v2 being class-m, we have∣∣∪i∈ν2,m(α)Σi∣∣ = |ν2,k(α)|Km.
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Also, we have
P[u(θn) = 0 | t1 = t2 = m] = 1− pmm.
Thus, we get
E [xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ) 1[u(θ) = 0]]
= µ2m(1− pmm)E


n∏
k=3
(
P − |ν2,k(α)Km|
|Σk|
)
(
P
|Σk|
)
∣∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = m


= µ2m(1− pmm)E


(
P − |ν2,3(α)|Km
|Σ3|
)
(
P
|Σ3|
)
∣∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = m


n−2
(53)
= µ2m(1− pmm)


r∑
j=1
µjE


(
P − |ν2,3(α)|Km
|Σ3|
)
(
P
|Σ3|
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
t1 = t2 = m
t3 = j




n−2
≤ µ2m(1− pmm)


r∑
j=1
µjE




(
P −Km
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)


|ν2,3(α)|
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
t1 = t2 = m
t3 = j




n−2
, (54)
where we use (18) in the last step. Note that conditioned on t1 = t2 = m, the random variables
{|ν2,k(α)|}nk=3 are independent and identically distributed, hence (53) follows. In particular
|ν2,k(α)|
∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = m ∼ Binomial (2, αmj) with probability µj, k = 3, 4, . . . , n
The above distributional equality could be explained as follows. We may write |ν2,k(α)| = 1 [v1 ∼G vk]+
1 [v2 ∼G vk]. Observe that conditioned on t1 = t2 = m, we know that nodes v1 and v2 belong to
class-m in G (n;µ,α). If node vk is class-j (an event that has probability µj), then 1 [v1 ∼G vk] and
1 [v2 ∼G vk] are each distributed as Bernoulli random variable with parameter αmj .
Now, let
Zj =
(
P −Km
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
) = 1− pmj , j = 1, . . . , r. (55)
Then,
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1 [u(θ) = 0]] ≤ µ2m(1− pmm)

 r∑
j=1
µjE
[
Z
|ν2,3(α)|
j
∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = mt3 = j
]
n−2
(56)
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Note that
|ν2,3(α)|
∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = mt3 = j ∼ Binomial(2, αmj)
Hence,
E
[
Z
|ν2,3(α)|
j
∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = mt3 = j
]
=
2∑
i=0
(
2
i
)
αimj(1− αmj)2−iZij
=
2∑
i=0
(
2
i
)
αimj(1− αmj)2−i (1− pmj)i
= 1− 2αmjpmj + (αmjpmj)2 (57)
upon recalling (55). Next, letW be a rv that takes the value αmjpmj with probability µj. It follows
that
r∑
j=1
µjE
[
Z
|ν2,3(α)|
j
∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = mt3 = j
]
= 1− 2Λm +
r∑
j=1
µj (αmjpmj)
2 = 1− 2Λm + E
[
W 2
]
Next, we recall (7) and let
k := argmin
j
αmjpmj
Now, in view of Popoviciu’s inequality [33, pp. 9], we see that
var(W ) ≤ 1
4
(Wmax −Wmin)2
=
1
4
(αmspms − αmkpmk)2
≤ 1
4
(αmspms)
2 (58)
We also know from (4) that
αmspms ≤ 1
µs
Λm (59)
From (58) and (59), we get
var(W ) ≤ 1
4µ2s
Λ2m (60)
It is now immediate that
E
[
W 2
]
= (E [W ])2 + var(W ) ≤
(
1 +
1
4µ2s
)
Λ2m (61)
by virtue of the fact that E [W ] = Λm. Using (61) into (56), we readily obtain
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1 [u(θ) = 0]] ≤ µ2m(1− pmm)
(
1− 2Λm +
(
1 +
1
4µ2s
)
Λ2m
)n−2
(62)
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Next, conditioning on u(θ) = 1 and t1 = t2 = m, we have
|∪i∈ν2,k(α)Σi| =


0 if |ν2,k(α)|= 0
Km if |ν2,k(α)|= 1
2Km − |Σ1 ∩ Σ2| if |ν2,k(α)|= 2
and by a crude bounding argument, we have
|∪i∈ν2,k(α)Σi|≥ Km1[|ν2,k(α)|> 0] (63)
Using (63) and recalling the analysis for E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1[u(θ) = 0]], we obtain
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1[u(θ) = 1]] ≤ µ2m(1− αmm)pmm
(
r∑
j=1
µjE
[
Z
1[|ν2,3(α)|>0]
j
∣∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = mt3 = j
])n−2
(64)
where
E
[
Z
1[|ν2,3(α)|>0]
j
∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = mt3 = j
]
= (1− αmj)2 +
(
1− (1− αmj)2
)
Zj = 1− 2αmjpmj + α2mjpmj
and it follows that
r∑
j=1
µjE
[
Z
1[|ν2,3(α)|>0]
j
∣∣∣∣ t1 = t2 = mt3 = j
]
= 1− 2Λm +
r∑
j=1
µjα
2
mjpmj
≤ 1− 2Λm + αmd
r∑
j=1
µjαmjpmj
= 1− (2− αmd)Λm (65)
upon recalling (6). From (64) and (65), we readily obtain
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)1 [u(θ) = 1]] ≤ µ2m(1− αmm)pmm (1− (2− αmd) Λm)n−2 (66)
Combining (62) and (66), we get
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)] = E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ) (1[u(θ) = 0] + 1[u(θ) = 1])]
≤ µ2m(1− pmm)
(
1− 2Λm +
(
1 +
1
4µ2s
)
Λ2m
)n−2
+ µ2m(1− αmm)pmm (1− (2− αmd)Λm)n−2 (67)
It is also clear that
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)] = µm (1− Λm)n−1 (68)
Combining (67) and (68), we get
E[xn,1(µ,Θ)xn,2(µ,Θ)]
E[xn,1(θ)]2
≤ (1− pmm)
(
1− 2Λm +
(
1 + 14µ2s
)
Λ2m
)n−2
(1− Λm)2(n−1)
+ pmm
(1− 2Λm + αmdΛm)n−2
(1− Λm)2(n−1)
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:= A+B (69)
where we use the fact that 1− αmm ≤ 1.
We now consider a scaling Θ : N0 → Nr+10 × (0, 1)r×r as stated in Proposition 6.2 and bound
the terms A and B in turn. Our goal is to show that
lim sup
n→∞
(A+B) ≤ 1. (70)
We have
A =
1− pmm
(1− Λm)2
(
1 +
1
4µ2s
(
Λm
1− Λm
)2)n−2
≤ 1− pmm
(1− Λm)2
eρn
where
ρn ≤
(
cn
2µs
)2
n
(
log n
n− cn log n
)2
= o(1)
and
(1− Λm(n))2 = 1− o(1) (71)
since Λm(n) = cn log n/n. Thus, we have
A ≤ (1− pmm)
(
(1 + o(1)) eo(1)
)
(72)
We now consider the second term in (69). Recall (71), we have
B =
pmm
(1− Λm)2
(
1 +
Λm (αmd − Λm)
(1− Λm)2
)n−2
≤ pmm
(1− Λm)2
eψn
Now, recalling (14), we get
ψn ≤ nΛm (αmd − Λm)
(1− Λm)2
=
cnαmd log n(
1− cn lognn
)2 − c2n
(logn)2
n(
1− cn lognn
)2 = cnαmd log n(
1− cn lognn
)2 − o(1)
Thus, we have
B ≤ pmm. exp

 cnαmd log n(
1− cn lognn
)2

 .((1 + o(1)) eo(1)) (73)
We will now establish the desired result (70) by using (72) and (73). Our approach is to consider
the cases i) limn→∞ αmd(n) log n = 0 and ii) limn→∞ αmm(n) log n ∈ (0,∞] separately.
Assume that limn→∞ αmd(n) log n = 0 . From (73) we get B ≤ (1 + o(1))pmm and upon using
(72) we see that A+B ≤ (1+o(1)) establishing (70) along subsequences with limn→∞ αmd(n) log n =
0.
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Assume that limn→∞ αmm(n) log n ∈ (0,∞] . From (4), we have
Λm =
r∑
j=1
µjαmjpmj ≥ µmαmmpmm
Thus,
B ≤ 1
µm
Λm
αmm
. exp

 cnαmd log n(
1− cn lognn
)2

 = 1
µm
Λm log n.
exp
(
cnαmd logn
(1−cn log nn )
2
)
αmm log n
≤ 1
µm
cn (log n)
2 n
−1+ cn
(1−cn log nn )
2
αmm log n
since αmd ≤ 1. We note that
lim
n→∞
−1 + cn(
1− cn lognn
)2 = −1 + c < 0
for c < 1. Thus, it follows that B = o(1) upon noting that limn→∞ αmm log n = α∗ ∈ (0,∞]. From
(72) and the fact that pmm ≤ 1, we have A+B ≤ 1 + o(1), and (70) follows.
Note that if the matrix α is designed in such a way that αii = maxj{αij}, i.e., two nodes of the
same type are more likely to be adjacent in G(n;µ,α), then we have αmd = αmm and the above
two cases collapse to i) limn→∞ αmm(n) log n = 0 or ii) limn→∞ αmm(n) log n ∈ (0,∞]. At this
point, the zero-law follows even when the sequence αmm log n does not have a limit by virtue of
the subsubsequence principle [27, p. 12] (see also [25, Section 7.3]). In other words, if αmd = αmm,
then the zero-law follows without any conditions on the sequence αmm(n) log n. 
7 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Let Cn(µ,Θn) denote the event that the graph H(n,µ,Θn) is connected, and with a slight abuse
of notation, let In(µ,Θn) denote the event that the graph H(n,µ,Θn) has no isolated nodes. It is
clear that if a random graph is connected then it does not have any isolated node, hence
Cn(µ,Θn) ⊆ In(µ,Θn)
and we get
P[Cn(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[In(µ,Θn)] (74)
and
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c] = P[In(µ,Θn)
c] + P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)]. (75)
In view of (74), we obtain the zero-law for connectivity, i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P[H(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 0 if c < 1,
immediately from the zero-law part of Theorem 3.1, i.e., from that limn→∞ P[In(µ,Θn)] = 0 if
c < 1 under the enforced assumptions. It remains to establish the one-law for connectivity. In the
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remainder of this section, we assume that (9) holds for some c > 1. From Theorem 3.1 and (75),
we see that the one-law for connectivity, i.e., that
lim
n→∞
P[H(n;µ,Θn) is connected] = 1 if c > 1,
will follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)] = 0. (76)
Our approach will be to find a suitable upper bound for (76) and prove that it goes to zero as n
goes to infinity with c > 1.
We now work towards deriving an upper bound for (76); then in Section 8 we will show that
the bound goes to zero as n gets large. Define the event En(µ,θ,X ) via
En(µ,θ,X ) := ∪S⊆N :|S|≥1
[|∪i∈SΣi|≤ X|S|]
where N = {1, . . . , n} and X = [X1 · · · Xn] is an n-dimensional array of integers. Let
Ln := min
(⌊
P
K1
⌋
,
⌊n
2
⌋)
(77)
and
Xℓ =
{
⌊βℓK1⌋ ℓ = 1, . . . , Ln
⌊γP ⌋ ℓ = Ln + 1, . . . , n
(78)
for some β and γ in (0, 12) that will be specified later. In words, En(µ,θ,X ) denotes the event that
there exists ℓ = 1, . . . , n such that the number of unique keys stored by at least one subset of ℓ
sensors is less than ⌊βℓK1⌋1[ℓ ≤ Ln] + ⌊γP ⌋1[ℓ > Ln]. Using a crude bound, we get
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)] ≤ P[En(µ,θn,Xn)] + P[Cn(µ,Θn)c ∩ In(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] (79)
Thus, (76) will be established by showing that
lim
n→∞
P[En(µ,θn,Xn)] = 0, (80)
and
lim
n→∞
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0 (81)
The next proposition establishes (80).
Proposition 7.1. Consider scalings K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 such that (9) holds for some c > 1,
(22) , and (10) hold. Then, we have (80) where Xn is as specified in (78), β ∈ (0, 12) and γ ∈ (0, 12 )
are selected such that
max

2βσ, β (e2
σ
) β
1−2β

 < 1 (82)
max
(
2
(√
γ
(
e
γ
)γ)σ
,
√
γ
(
e
γ
)γ)
< 1 (83)
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Proof. The proof is similar to [18, Proposition 7.2]. Results only require the conditions (10) and
(32) to hold. The latter condition is clearly established in Lemma 5.5. 
The rest of the paper is devoted to establishing (81) under the enforced assumptions on the
scalings and withXn as specified in (78), β ∈ (0, 12) selected small enough such that (82) holds, and
γ ∈ (0, 12) selected small enough such that (83) holds. We denote by H(n,µ,Θn)(S) a subgraph of
H(n,µ,Θn) whose vertices are restricted to the set S. Define the events
Cn(µ,Θn, S) := [H(n,µ,Θn)(S) is connected]
Bn(µ,Θn, S) := [H(n,µ,Θn)(S) is isolated]
An(µ,Θn, S) := Cn(µ,Θn, S) ∩Bn(µ,Θn, S)
In other words, An(µ,Θn, S) encodes the event that H(n,µ,Θn)(S) is a component, i.e., a connected
subgraph that is isolated from the rest of the graph. The key observation is that a graph is not
connected if and only if it has a component on vertices S with 1 ≤ |S|≤ ⌊n2 ⌋; note that if vertices
S form a component then so do vertices N − S. The event In(µ,Θn) eliminates the possibility of
H(n,µ,Θn)(S) containing a component of size one (i.e., an isolated node), whence we have
Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn) ⊆ ∪S∈N :2≤|S|≤⌊n2 ⌋An(µ,Θn, S)
and the conclusion
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn)] ≤
∑
S∈N :2≤|S|≤⌊n2 ⌋
P[An(µ,Θn, S)]
follows.
By exchangeability, we get
P[Cn(µ,Θn)
c ∩ In(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] ≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2

 ∑
S∈Nn,ℓ
P[An(µ,Θn, S) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c]


=
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] (84)
whereNn,ℓ denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , n} with exactly ℓ elements, and An,ℓ(µ,Θn)
denotes the event that the set {1, . . . , ℓ} of nodes form a component. As before we have An,ℓ(µ,Θn) =
Cℓ(µ,Θn) ∩Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn), where Cℓ(µ,Θn) denotes the event that the set {1, . . . , ℓ} of nodes is con-
nected and Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) denotes the event that the set {1, . . . , ℓ} of nodes is isolated from the rest
of the graph.
It is now clear that (81) is established once we show that
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c = 0. (85)
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We proceed by deriving bounds on the probabilities appearing in (85). Conditioning on Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ
and {Bij(α), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ}, we get
P [An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
= E
[
E
[
1 [Cℓ (µ,Θn) ∩Bn,ℓ (µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,ΣℓBij(α), i, j = 1, . . . , ℓ
]]
= E
[
1 [Cℓ (µ,Θn)] · P
[
Bn,ℓ (µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c
∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ ]] (86)
since Cℓ(µ,Θn) is fully determined by Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ and {Bij(αn), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ}, and Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn)
and En(µ,θn,Xn) are independent from {Bij(α), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ℓ}.
Next, we consider the probabilities appearing in (86). For each ℓ = 1, . . . , n − 1, we have
Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) =
n⋂
k=ℓ+1
[∣∣∣∪i∈νℓ,k(α)Σi∣∣∣ ∩Σk = ∅]
with νℓ,k(α) as defined in (52). We have
P [Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) | Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ] = E
[
E

1 [Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn)]
∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σn,
Bij(α) : i = 1, . . . , ℓ,
j = ℓ+ 1, . . . , n


∣∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ
]
= E


n∏
k=ℓ+1
(
P − |∪i∈νℓ,k(α)Σi|
|Σk|
)
(
P
|Σk|
) ∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ


Observe that on the event En(µ,θn,Xn)
c we have∣∣∣∪i∈νℓ,k(α)Σi∣∣∣ ≥ (Xn,|νℓ,k(α)| + 1)1[|νℓ,k(α)| > 0]
Moreover, the crude bound ∣∣∣∪i∈νℓ,k(α)Σi∣∣∣ ≥ Ktmin,ℓ1[|νℓ,k(α)| > 0]
always holds with tmin,ℓ = min{t1, . . . , tℓ}. Hence, we can write
P [Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c | Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ]
≤ E


n∏
k=ℓ+1
(
P −max
(
Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,k(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,k(α)| > 0]
|Σk|
)
(
P
|Σk|
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ


Note that conditioned on Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σℓ, we can determine the class of each node in {1, . . . , ℓ},
i.e., ti = 1 · 1 [|Σi|= K1] + 2 · 1 [|Σi|= K2] + . . . + r · 1 [|Σi|= Kr] for i = 1, . . . , ℓ. Moreover, since
|νℓ,k(α)| = 1 [v1 ∼G vk] +1 [v2 ∼G vk]+ . . .+1 [vℓ ∼G vk], the random variables {|νℓ,k(α)|}nk=ℓ+1 are
independent and identically distributed. In particular
|νℓ,k(α)|
∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ ∼ Poisson-Binomial (ℓ,p = (αt1j , αt2j , . . . , αtℓj)) with probability µj
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for k = ℓ+ 1, 4, . . . , n. It follows that
P [Bn,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c | Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ]
≤

E


(
P −max
(
Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0]
|Σk|
)
(
P
|Σk|
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ




n−ℓ
=


r∑
j=1
µjE


(
P −max
(
Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0]
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j




n−ℓ
(87)
by the law of total expectation. Reporting (87) into (86), we then get
P [An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] ≤ E

1 [Cℓ (µ,Θn)] ·
·


r∑
j=1
µjE


(
P −max
(
Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0]
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j




n−ℓ 

(88)
The following lemma gives bounds on the terms appearing in (88). The proof is given in
Appendix A.
Lemma 7.2. Consider a probability distribution µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µr), integers K1 ≤ · · · ≤ Kr ≤
P/2, and α = {αij} for i, j = 1, . . . , r with αij ∈ (0, 1). With Xn as specified in (78), β ∈ (0, 12 )
and γ ∈ (0, 12) as specified in (82) and (83) respectively, we have
P[Cℓ(µ,Θ)] ≤ min
{
1, ℓℓ−2
(
max
i,j
{αijpij}
)ℓ−1}
(89)
and


r∑
j=1
µjE


(
P −max
(
Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0]
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j




n−ℓ
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≤
(
min
{
1− Λm,min
{
1− µr + µre−αminp1rβℓ, e−αminp11βℓ
}
+ e−γK11 [ℓ > Ln]
})n−ℓ
(90)
Note that as we report (90) back into (88), we get
P [An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤ E
[
1 [Cℓ (µ,Θn)] ·
·
(
min
{
1− Λm,min
{
1− µr + µre−αminp1rβℓ, e−αminp11βℓ
}
+ e−γK11 [ℓ > Ln]
})n−ℓ ]
= P[Cℓ(µ,Θ)] ·
(
min
{
1− Λm,min
{
1− µr + µre−αminp1rβℓ, e−αminp11βℓ
}
+ e−γK11 [ℓ > Ln]
})n−ℓ
(91)
In addition, it holds that
max
i,j
{αijpij} ≤ αmaxprr (92)
Our proof of (81) will be completed (see (84)) upon establishing
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0 (93)
by means of (89), (90), and (91). These steps are taken in the next section.
8 Establishing (93)
We will establish (93) in several steps with each step focusing on a specific range of the summation
over ℓ. Throughout, we consider a scalings K1, . . . ,Kr, P : N0 → Nr+10 and α : N0 → (0, 1)r×r such
that (9) holds with c > 1, (22), (11), (13), and (10) hold.
8.1 The case where 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ R
This range considers fixed values of ℓ. Pick an integer R to be specified later at (99). Use (9), (21),
(33), (34), (89), the first bound in (90), and (92) to get
R∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] ≤
R∑
ℓ=2
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2 (αmax(n)prr(n))
ℓ−1 (1− Λm(n))n−ℓ
≤
R∑
ℓ=2
(en)ℓ
(
(log n)τ+2
n
)ℓ−1(
1− cn log n
n
)n−ℓ
≤
R∑
ℓ=2
n
(
e(log n)τ+2
)ℓ
e−cn logn
n−ℓ
n
=
R∑
ℓ=2
(
e(log n)τ+2
)ℓ
n1−cn
n−ℓ
n
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With c > 1, we have limn→∞
(
1− cn n−ℓn
)
= 1 − c < 0. Thus, for each ℓ = 2, 3, . . . , R and a finite
τ > 0, we have (
e(log n)τ+2
)ℓ−1
n1−cn
n−ℓ
n = o(1),
whence we get
lim
n→∞
R∑
ℓ=2
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0.
8.2 The case where R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ min{Ln, ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋}
Our goal in this and the next subsection is to cover the range R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋. Since the
bound given at (90) takes a different form when ℓ > Ln, we first consider the range R + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤
min{Ln, ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋}. Using (21), (33), (34), (89), the second bound in (90), and (92) we get
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2
(
(log n)τ+2
n
)ℓ−1
·
(
1− µr
(
1− e−αmin(n)βℓp1r(n)
))n−ℓ
(94)
From the upper bound in (20) and ℓ ≤ µrnβcn logn , we have
αmin(n)βℓp1r(n) ≤ β µrn
βcn log n
cn
µr
log n
n
= 1.
Using the fact that 1− e−x ≥ x2 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we get
1− µr
(
1− e−αmin(n)βℓp1r(n)
)
≤ 1− µrαmin(n)βℓp1r(n)
2
≤ e−βℓµrρ log n2n (95)
using the lower bound in (15). Reporting this last bound in to (94) and noting that
n− ℓ ≥ n
2
, ℓ = 2, 3, . . . ,
⌊n
2
⌋
, (96)
we get
min{Ln,
⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋
}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] ≤
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
n
(
e(log n)τ+2
)ℓ
e−βℓµrρ
log n
2n
n
2
≤ n
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
e (log n)τ+2 e−βρ
µr
4
logn
)ℓ
≤ n
∞∑
ℓ=R+1
(
e (log n)τ+2 e−βρ
µr
4
logn
)ℓ
(97)
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Given that β, ρ, µr > 0 and τ is finite, we clearly have
e (log n)τ+2 e−βρ logn
µr
4 = o(1). (98)
Thus, the geometric series in (97) is summable for n sufficiently large, and we have
min{Ln,⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋}∑
ℓ=R+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] ≤ (1 + o(1)) n
(
e (log n)τ+2 e−βρ logn
µr
4
)R+1
= (1 + o(1)) n1−(R+1)βρ
µr
4
(
e(log n)τ+2
)R+1
= o(1)
for any positive integer R with
R >
8
βρµr
. (99)
This choice is permissible given that ρ, β, µr > 0.
8.3 The case where min{⌊ µrn
βcn logn
⌋,max(R,Ln)} < ℓ ≤ ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋
Clearly, this range becomes obsolete if max(R,Ln) ≥ ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋. Thus, it suffices to consider the
subsequences for which the range max(R,Ln) + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋ is non-empty. There, we use
(21), (33), (34), (89), the second bound in (90), and (92) to get
⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] (100)
≤
⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(en
ℓ
)ℓ
ℓℓ−2
(
(log n)τ+2
n
)ℓ−1
·
(
1− µr
(
1− e−βℓαmin(n)p1r(n)
)
+ e−γK1,n
)n
2
≤
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
n
(
e (log n)τ+2
)ℓ (
e−βℓρµr
logn
2n + e−γK1,n
)n
2
where in the last step we used (95) in view of ℓ ≤ µrnβcn logn .
Next, we write
e−βℓρµr
logn
2n + e−γK1,n = e−βℓρµr
log n
2n
(
1 + e−γK1,n+βℓρµr
log n
2n
)
≤ exp
{
−βℓρµr log n
2n
+ e−γK1,n+βℓρµr
log n
2n
}
≤ exp

−βℓρµr log n2n

1− e−γK1,n+
ρµ2r
2cn
βℓρµr
logn
2n



 (101)
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where the last inequality is obtained from ℓ ≤ µrnβcn logn . Using the fact that ℓ > Ln = min{⌊ PnK1,n ⌋, ⌊n2 ⌋}
and (10) we have
e−γK1,n
βℓρµr
logn
2n
≤ max
{
K1,n
Pn
,
2
n
}
2n
e−γK1,n
βρµr log n
≤ max
{
2K1,ne
−γK1,n
βρµrσ log n
,
4e−γK1,n
βρµr log n
}
= o(1)
by virtue of (32) and the facts that β, µr, σ, ρ > 0. Reporting this into (101), we see that for for
any ǫ > 0, there exists a finite integer n∗(ǫ) such that(
e−βℓρµr
log n
2n + e−γK1,n
)
≤ e−βℓρµr log n2n (1−ǫ) (102)
for all n ≥ n∗(ǫ). Using (102) in (100), we get
⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] ≤ n
⌊
µrn
βcn log n
⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
e (log n)τ+2 e−βρµr
logn
2n
(1−ǫ)n
2
)ℓ
≤ n
∞∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
e (log n)τ+2 e−βρµr
logn
4
(1−ǫ)
)ℓ
(103)
Similar to (98), we have
(
e (log n)τ+2 e−βρµr
log n
4
(1−ǫ)
)
= o(1) so that the sum in (103) converges.
Following a similar approach to that in Section 8.2, we then see that
lim
n→∞
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋∑
ℓ=max(R,Ln)+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0
with R selected according to (99) and ǫ < 1/2.
8.4 The case where ⌊ µrn
βcn logn
⌋ + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊νn⌋
We consider ⌊ µrnβcn logn⌋ + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊νn⌋ for some ν ∈ (0, 12) to be specified later. Recall (15), (34),
the first bound in (89), and the second bound in (90). Noting that
(
n
ℓ
)
is monotone increasing in
ℓ when 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋ and using (96) we get
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=⌊ µrn
βcn log n
⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c]
≤
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=⌊ µrn
βcn log n
⌋+1
(
n
⌊νn⌋
)
·
(
1− µr + µre−αmin(n)βℓp1r(n) + e−γK1,n
)n
2
≤
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=⌊ µrn
βcn log n
⌋+1
( e
ν
)νn · (1− µr + µre−β µrnβcn log n ρ log nn + e−γK1,n)n2
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≤ n
( e
ν
)νn (
1− µr + µre−
ρµr
cn + e−γK1,n
)n
2
= n
(( e
ν
)2ν (
1− µr + µre−
ρµr
cn + e−γK1,n
))n2
(104)
We have 1 − µr + µre−
ρµr
cn < 1 from µr, ρ, c > 0 and e
−γK1,n = o(1) from (32). Also, it holds
that limν→0
(
e
ν
)2ν
= 1. Thus, if we pick ν small enough to ensure that
( e
ν
)2ν (
1− µr + µre−
ρµr
cn
)
< 1, (105)
then for any 0 < ǫ < 1− (e/ν)2ν
(
1− µr + µre−
ρµr
cn
)
there exists a finite integer n⋆(ǫ) such that
( e
ν
)2ν (
1− µr + µre−
ρµr
cn + e−γK1,n
)
≤ 1− ǫ, ∀n ≥ n⋆(ǫ).
Reporting this into (104), we get
lim
n→∞
⌊νn⌋∑
ℓ=
⌊
µrn
2βc log n
⌋
+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0
since limn→∞ n(1− ǫ)n/2 = 0.
8.5 The case where ⌊νn⌋+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋
In this range, we use (35), the first bound in (89), the last bound in (90), and (96) to get
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩ En(µ,θn,Xn)c] ≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)(
e−βℓαmin(n)p11(n) + e−γK1,n
)n
2
≤


⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)(e−βνnαmin(n)p11(n) + e−γK1,n)n2
≤
(
4e−βνnαmin(n)p11(n) + 4e−γK1,n
)n
2
With β, ν, γ > 0 have e−βνnαmin(n)p11(n) = o(1) from (22) and e−γK1,n = o(1) from (32). The
conclusion
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
ℓ=⌊νn⌋+1
(
n
ℓ
)
P[An,ℓ(µ,Θn) ∩En(µ,θn,Xn)c] = 0
immediately follows and the proof of one-law is completed.
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A Establishing Lemma 7.2
The bounds given at Lemma 7.2 are valid irrespective of how the parameters involved scale with
n. Thus, we consider fixed Θ with constraints given in the statement of Lemma 7.2.
Recall that conditioned on Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σℓ and tℓ+1 = j, the rv |νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| is distributed as a
Poisson-Binomial rv with ℓ trials and success probability vector p = {αt1j , . . . , αtℓj}. With a slight
abuse of notation, let Wℓ,j = 1− ptmin,ℓj . Using a crude bound and then (18) we get
E


(
P −max
(
Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0]
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j


≤ E


(
P −Ktmin,ℓ1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0]
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j


≤ E
[
W
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)|>0]
ℓ,j
∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,tℓ+1 = j
]
=
ℓ∏
k=1
(1− αtkj) +
(
1−
ℓ∏
k=1
(1− αtkj)
)
Wℓ,j
=
ℓ∏
k=1
(1− αtkj) (1−Wℓ,j) +Wℓ,j
≤ (1− αtmin,ℓj) (1−Wℓ,j) +Wℓ,j
= 1− αtmin,ℓjptmin,ℓj. (A.1)
upon noting that αtkj < 1 for k = 1, . . . , ℓ and j = 1, . . . , r. It is now immediate that
r∑
j=1
µj
(
1− αtmin,ℓjptmin,ℓj
)
= 1− Λtmin,ℓ ≤ 1− Λm (A.2)
Next, consider range ℓ = 1, . . . , Ln, where we have(
Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0] ≥ ⌈β |νℓ,ℓ+1(α)|K1⌉
With a slight abuse of notation, let Zj = 1− p1j . Recalling (18), we get
E


(
P −max
(
Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1
)
1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0]
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j

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≤ E

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(
P − ⌈β |νℓ,ℓ+1(α)|K1⌉
Kj
)
(
P
Kj
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Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j


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≤ E
[
Z
β|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)|
j
∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,tℓ+1 = j
]
(A.3)
Recall that
|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| = 1 [v1 ∼G vℓ+1] + 1 [v2 ∼G vℓ+1] + . . .+1 [vℓ ∼G vℓ+1]
and note that conditioned on Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ and that tℓ+1 = j, the indicator random variables 1 [vi ∼G vℓ+1]
are each distributed as a Bernoulli random variable with parameter αtij for i = 1, . . . , r, where ti
denotes the class of node vi. Let αminj = min {α1j , α2j , . . . , αrj}. It follows that
|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| 
∣∣νℓ,ℓ+1(αminj )∣∣
where
∣∣νℓ,ℓ+1(αminj )∣∣ denotes a binomial rv with parameters ℓ and αminj , and the operator 
denotes the usual stochastic ordering. It follows that
E

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ℓ
k
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(
1− Zβj
))ℓ
≤ (1− αminjβ (1− Zj))ℓ
≤ e−αminj (1−Zj)βℓ
= e
−αminjp1jβℓ (A.4)
using the fact that 1 − Zβj ≥ β(1 − Zj) with Zj ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; a proof is available at
[32, Lemma 5.2]. On the range ℓ = Ln + 1, . . . ,
⌊
n
2
⌋
, |νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| can be less than or equal to Ln or
greater than Ln. In the latter case, we have
max(Ktmin,ℓ ,Xn,|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| + 1)1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > 0] ≥ ⌊γP ⌋+ 1
Using (A.3), (A.4), and the fact that (see [34, Lemma 5.4.1] for a proof)(
P −K1
K2
)/(
P
K2
)
≤ e−K2P K1
for K1 +K2 ≤ P , we have
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∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,
tℓ+1 = j


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≤ E
[
Z
β|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)|
j 1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| ≤ Ln]
∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,tℓ+1 = j
]
+ E
[
e−
Kj
P
(⌊γP ⌋+1)1[|νℓ,ℓ+1(α)| > Ln]
∣∣∣∣ Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ,tℓ+1 = j
]
≤ e−αminjp1jβℓ + e−γK11[ℓ > Ln] (A.5)
by virtue of the fact that Kj ≥ K1.
Finally, we note the bounds
r∑
j=1
µje
−αminj p1jβℓ ≤ (1− µr) + µre−αminrp1rβℓ
≤ (1− µr) + µre−αminp1rβℓ
and that
r∑
j=1
µje
−αminj p1jβℓ ≤ e−αminp11βℓ (A.6)
The last step used the fact that pij is monotone increasing in both i and j and αminj ≥ αmin.
Note that one could replace αmin with αminr in condition (11) to obtain a more intuitive (and
milder) bound that only constraints the product min {α1r(n), α2r(n), . . . , αrr(n)} p1r(n) instead of
mini,j {αij(n)} p1r(n). In this case, it would also follow that
αminrp1r ≤ αmrpmr = O(Λm) = O(log n/n)
which is needed in establishing (93) along with αminrp1r(n) = Ω(log n/n) on several ranges of ℓ (see
Section 8). However, it would still be needed to show that
r∑
j=1
µje
−αminj p1jβℓ = o(1) (A.7)
so as to establish (93) on the range where ⌊νn⌋ + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋ (see Section 8.5). Observe that on
this range, we have
r∑
j=1
µje
−αminj p1jβℓ ≤
r∑
j=1
µje
−βνnαminjp11
and the desired conclusion (A.7) would follow if nαminjp11 = ω(1) for j = 1, . . . , r. We have (as we
invoke (12) and the proposed modification of (11))
αminjp11 =
αminj
αminr
p11
p1r
αminrp1r =
αminj
αminr
ω
(
1
log n
)
Ω
(
log n
n
)
= ω
(
αminj
αminr
1
n
)
and the desired conclusion follows if one assumes that
αminj ∼ αminr , j = 1, . . . , r − 1 (A.8)
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i.e., if the per-row minima of the matrix α are all of the same asymptotic order1. Indeed, the
asymptotic equivalency given in (A.8) implies that αmin(n) and αminr(n) would need to be on
the same order, which essentially translates to (11). Put differently, establishing (A.7) under the
modified condition, i.e., αminr(n)p1r(n) = Ω (log n/n), requires a new set of asymptotic equivalence
conditions that, when combined with the modified condition, are essentially equivalent to (11).
Next, we establish (89). Let Hℓ(n;µ,Θ) denote the subgraph of H(n;µ,Θ) induced on the
vertices {v1, . . . , vℓ}. Hℓ(n;µ,Θ) is connected if and only if it contains a spanning tree; i.e., we have
Cℓ(µ,Θ) = ∪T∈Tℓ [T ⊆ Hℓ(n;µ,Θ)]
where Tℓ denotes the collection of all spanning trees on the vertices {v1, . . . , vℓ}. Thus,
P[Cℓ(µ,Θ)] ≤
∑
T∈Tℓ
P [T ⊆ Hℓ(n;µ,Θ)] . (A.9)
Observe that
P [T ⊆ Hℓ(n;µ,Θ)] = E [E [1 [T ⊆ Hℓ(n;µ,Θ)] | Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ]]
= E [P [T ⊆ Hℓ(n;µ,Θ) | Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ]]
≤
(
max
i,j
{αijpij}
)ℓ−1
(A.10)
where the last inequality follows from the facts that i) a tree on ℓ vertices contain ℓ − 1 edges,
and ii) conditioned on Σ1, . . . ,Σℓ, edge assignments in Hℓ(n;µ,Θ) are independent and each edge
probability is upper bounded by (maxi,j {αijpij}). Note that as we use this upper bound, the
randomness (stemming from the random variables Σ1, Σ2, etc.) disappears and (A.10) follows. We
obtain (89) upon using (A.10) in (A.9) and noting by Cayley’s formula [35] that there are ℓℓ−2 trees
on ℓ vertices, i.e., |Tℓ|= ℓℓ−2.
1This would also give K1 = ω(1) since αmin1p11 = ω(1/n) and K
2
1/P = Ω(p11). This condition is needed on the
range ⌊νn⌋ + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋.
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